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II.  ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.  The ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not barred by res
judicata.
The general term “res judicata” includes both true res judicata (claim
preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion).  Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144
Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613, 617 (2007).  But, as Mr. Rendon has already noted,
“[t]his cause is not barred by true res judicata because this ineffective assistance of
counsel claim is not the same claim which was brought in the motion to withdraw
guilty plea.”  He goes on to say that there may be “some future issue preclusion
effects from that prior decision,” but those do not affect the issues raised here. 
Opening Brief, pg. 2, ft.1.  Those statements continue to be true.
Here, neither the Cuyler nor the Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel
claim is barred by the prior resolution of the motion to withdraw guilty plea.  While
both IAC claims raise a similar issue, i.e., whether there was an actual conflict of
interest, they are different claims from the motion to withdraw guilty plea.  State v.
Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 11 P.3d 481 (2000), does not support the state’s position
because that case addressed issue preclusion, not claim preclusion.  The Court wrote
that because “Rhoades is now seeking to relitigate the same issue already decided by
the district judge and not appealed . . . consideration of the present motion is barred
by the doctrine of res judicata[.]”  Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 864, 11 P.3d at 483
(emphasis added).  In Johnson v. State, 158 Idaho 852, 353 P.3d 1086 (Ct. App.
2015), a second successive post-conviction petition “assert[ed] the same claims that
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were presented in the first successive petition, along with additional reasons as to
why there was sufficient reason to file the claims in the second successive petition.” 
Johnson, 158 Idaho at 855, 353 P.3d at 1089.  Here, the IAC claims are not the
same as the one previously raised.
The claim in a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is that there is “a just reason
for withdrawing the plea.” State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 801, 761 P.2d 1151, 1153
(1988).  Mr. Rendon’s post-conviction claim under Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335
(1980), was that trial counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest and that
counsel’s representation was adversely affected by that conflict.  “In order to
establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection
at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his
lawyer’s performance.” State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 61, 90 P.3d 278, 286 (2003),
on reh'g, 140 Idaho 73, 90 P.3d 298 (2004) quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348.  Those
are not the same claims and claim preclusion does not bar the litigation of the
Cuyler claim.  Separate from the Cuyler claim, Mr. Rendon also alleged that his
attorney at the motion to withdraw guilty plea did not provide effective assistance of
counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984), because  he “did not
adequately investigate or argue the conflict of interest of Mr. Fuller or Mr. Brown as
is documented herein.” R 161.  Mr. Rendon further alleged, “Had Mr. Crane
presented the facts as contained in this Verified Amended Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different
3
because Mr. Fuller’s representation of Petitioner would have been developed, Mr.
Brown’s representation of Mr. Austin would have been further demonstrated, and
the confidential communication to both Mr. Fuller and Mr. Brown would have been
shown.”  R 162.  The Strickland claim alleged deficient performance by defense
counsel at the motion to withdraw guilty plea and resulting prejudice.  That claim is
not the same as the motion to withdraw guilty plea claim and claim preclusion does
not apply.
As to issue preclusion, the issues in the Strickland claim do not overlap with
the issues in the motion to withdraw guilty plea.  It is too early to tell whether issue
preclusion will bar relitigation of the conflict of interest issue.  In the district court, 
Rendon also asserted that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty
plea because his defense counsel had a conflict of interest. Specifically,
Rendon asserted a conflict because, at the same time defense counsel
was representing him, defense counsel's firm was also representing an
individual whom the state had identified in pretrial filings as a
possible witness for the prosecution.  Rendon also stated, however, that
he knew this pursuant to personal conversations with the potential
witness occurring prior to the entry of his guilty plea, but that he did
not tell his defense counsel. The district court, relying on defense
counsel’s testimony . . . concluded that, because defense counsel had not
learned that the witness might testify contrary to Rendon’s interests
prior to the entry of Rendon’s guilty plea, “the court cannot find that
there existed an actual, impermissible conflict of interest which
prejudiced Mr. Rendon or denied his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.”
State v. Rendon, No. 38275, 2012 WL 9492805, at *3 (Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis
added).  In the post-conviction petition, Mr. Rendon argued that defense counsel’s
testimony that he did not have contact with Mr. Austin while representing Mr.
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Rendon may not be correct.  T pg. 10, ln. 16-24.   If discovery shows that Mr. Brown
misrepresented his involvement in Mr. Austin’s case and the state was aware of
that misrepresentation, then issue preclusion may not be applicable because the
ruling was obtained by fraud.  “It has been held by some authorities that a
judgment fraudulently obtained does not operate as res judicata[.]”  50 C.J.S.
Judgments § 952.  While other authorities have held that a judgment procured by
fraud or by the concoction and use of false testimony will still have res judicata
effect, id, it does not appear that Idaho has definitively ruled on the issue.  But see,
Waller v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 146 Idaho 234, 238, 192 P.3d 1058, 1062
(2008) (“absent fraud or collusion, the principle of res judicata applies equally in
cases of default judgment”) (emphasis added); Robinson v. Robinson, 70 Idaho 122,
128, 212 P.2d 1031, 1034 (1949) (“In the absence of fraud or collusion a judgment is
conclusive as between the parties and their privies on all issues which were (or
should have been) litigated in the action.”) (citing 50 C.J.S. Judgments); compare,
Farmers Nat’l Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 70, 878 P.2d 762, 769 (1994) (In
situation where a creditor involved in a bankruptcy proceeding acted fraudulently,
Court held that such a creditor may still defend itself with the doctrine of res
judicata when the defrauded party had notice of the actions taken in the
bankruptcy court and should have exercised due diligence in discovering the nature
of the creditor’s actions.).  However, even if issue preclusion applies to the Cuyler
claim it does not apply to the Strickland claim.  Thus, the district court’s denial of
5
the motion for permission to conduct discovery cannot be affirmed on the alternative
ground of res judicata.
B.  The district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for
discovery.
The state argues that “[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion because
the requested deposition of Mr. Austin would have had no bearing on Rendon’s
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest.”  Respondent’s
Brief, pg. 16.  It makes no mention of Mr. Rendon’s Strickland claim.  But recall
that the court found the Strickland claim to be “bare and conclusory” as to both the
deficient performance and prejudice prongs. R 347.  Discovery from Mr. Austin of an
actual conflict of interest (in addition to the evidence of concurrent representation)
would be relevant to show that Mr. Crane’s performance in preparing for the motion
to withdraw guilty plea was deficient.  In addition, if Mr. Austin’s deposition shows
that Mr. Brown’s testimony about the timing of his representation was untruthful,
that would have been powerful counter evidence regarding the precise testimony the
district court based its ruling upon.  The failure to present such evidence would be
deficient performance by Mr. Crane if Mr. Austin could have been called to testify at
the motion to withdraw guilty plea.  And any evidence from Mr. Austin showing an
adverse affect in Mr. Fuller’s and/or Mr. Brown’s representation of Mr. Rendon
would have demonstrated prejudice under Strickland because the motion to
withdraw his guilty plea would have been granted had Mr. Rendon been able to
establish a Cuyler violation at the hearing.  That Sixth Amendment violation would
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have been sufficient to meet the “just reason” standard applied to pre-sentence
motions to withdraw guilty pleas. I.C.R. 33(c) and  State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330,
333, 208 P.3d 734, 737 (Ct. App. 2009) (A motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed
before sentencing may be granted upon a showing of a “just reason.”)
It is worth noting that post-conviction counsel made diligent efforts to verify
the truth of Mr. Brown’s statement without resorting to formal discovery.  First, he
sought the jail attorney sign-in sheets to prove that Mr. Brown had visited Mr.
Austin while representing Mr. Rendon, but found that the sheets were reportedly
lost.  T pg. 5, ln. 17-25.  Then, the very afternoon after post-conviction counsel spoke
to Mr. Austin informally and got him to agree to review an affidavit, he received the
letter from Mr. Brown’s employer, Mr. Fuller, which accused counsel of making
improper contact with a represented person and threatened to report counsel to the
bar association.  T pg. 7, ln. 5-18; R 277.  At that point, post-conviction counsel
sought discovery from the court.  While discretionary, the district court is required
to permit discovery when it is “necessary to protect an applicant’s substantial
rights.” Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 375, 825 P.2d 94, 98 (Ct. App.1992).  Here,
discovery was necessary because post-conviction counsel’s informal attempts to
determine the truth of Mr. Brown’s statements were stymied.
III.  CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Rendon asks this Court to vacate the
summary dismissal of the amended petition and remand the matter so that the
7
requested discovery may be conducted.    
Respectfully submitted this 8  day of June, 2016.th
______/s/________________________
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Steven Rendon
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